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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E. HALVORSON, INC., and THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THEODORE L. WILLIAMS, and 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-




BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs' petition for review of the Industrial 
Commission's order requiring plaintiffs to pay the 
entire amount awarded applicant for permanent total 





The applicant made claim for permanent total dis· 
ability. The Industrial Commission heard evidence on 
said claim. It awarded applicant the maximum amount 
allowed for a permanent total disability and ordered 
plaintiffs to pay the entire amount of the award. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants submit the Order of the Commis· 
sion should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to October 13, 1964, the defendant, Theodore 
L. Williams, worked regularly as a carpenter perform· 
ing a variety of duties requiring "heavy" muscular 
exertion ( T. 79). On that date, while employed by 
E. Halvorson, Inc., a platform floor joist on which 
he was standing tipped with him and he plummeted , 
approximately 20 feet to a cement apron. The impact 
caused severe injury to both feet and lower back. He 
was taken to a hospital by ambulance where x-rays 
indicated the presence of bilateral severe oscalcis frac· 
tures of both feet and a compression fracture of the 
L-1 vertebra (T. 1, 43). Within the next two days. 
Mr. Williams' condition deteriorated in a pronounced 
manner delaying treatment of his fractures. His abdo· 
men became distended, he suffered from shock, (T. 43i 
2 
I . 
his blood pressure was very low, and he complained of 
severe chest pains of a constricting nature radiating 
into his back. The latter difficulty had not been experi-
enced by the defendant either before or at the time of 
his admission to the hospital (T. 52), and it was con-
duded that he had suffered from a coronary throm-
bosis sometime after his admission. Mr. Williams' con-
dition was further complicated by a renal shutdown 
followed by pneumonia. 
Regarding his condition following the injury sus-
tained on October 13, 1964, the medical panel stated: 
In summary, Dr. Null concluded that Mr. 
V\Tilliams had an acute coronary thrombosis and 
myocardial infarction during hospitalization, 
probably the evening of October 14 or the early 
morning hours of October 15 with subsequent 
arterial hypotension with resultant renal com-
promise attendant to the syndrome of lower 
nephronephrosis; that he recovered from his epi-
sode of acute myocardial damage, associated 
renal damage; that he also sustained a bout of 
pneumonitis in the postoperative phase follow-
ing repair of his ankles. After this period of 
time, there does not appear to have been subse-
quent deterioration of his cardiac status, but he 
does have anginal symptomatology on moderate 
exercise, compromised by the fact that he has 
chronic bronchitis and chronic, obstructive, pneu-
monary emphysema unrelated to his accident 
... Dr. Null states that it is difficult to estab-
lish any causal relation between the ankle frac-
tures and the heart-kidney-lung condition, but 
that it is entirely possible that the trauma asso-
ciated with the fall and ankle fractures did in-
3 
deed result in enough stress to induce the initial 
cardiac episode and subsequent period of hypo-
tension and renal compromise. ( T. 54, 55). 
Dr. N ull's report to the panel further elicidated on 
the causality of Mr. Williams' physical disabilities: 
I am unable to state at this time if there is any 
distinct cause of relationship between the fall 
and the acute myocardial injury, however, it 
would seem quite likely that the hypotensive epi· 
sode subsequent to the myocardial injury was 
related etiolologically to the renal compromise. 
(T. 60) . 
. . . he was found to have a severely low blood 
pressure and electrocardiographic evidence of 
a myocardial infarction . . . Following treat· 
ment successfully for the hypotension, he went 
into a period of renal shutdown with extreme 
azotemia-kidney poisoning. This was treated 
rather heroically with three peritoneal dialyses. · 
Following this, he went into a period of high 
urine output requiring intravenous infusions. 
Subsequent to this, he developed an anemia re· 
quiring blood transfusions, and following this a 
pneumonia. The Panel feels that all of these 
events-disease.i;;-were causally related to the 
accident ... he continues to have angina ... Suc!1 
angina may reasonably be causally related to his 
myocardial infarction. The Panel finds that .Mr. 
Williams has severe, chronic pulmonary disease 
which in itself would be sufficient reason for 
total and permanent disability. (T. 41, 42). 
It is to be noted that the medical panel's evaluation 
of Mr. Williams was predicated on a complete report 
from Dr. Null, for Dr. Vico, chairman of the panrl 
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had expressly requested that Dr. Null supply a "cur-
rent evaluation of his present status, especially for 
any residual of his serious medi~al illness while in the 
hospital following his accident." (T. 33). The panel 
complimented Dr. Null for the depth of his study and 
tl1e "heroic treatment" administered to this "very sick 
man" (T. 34). 
The panel's report included the following charac-
teriiation of Mr. Williams' hospital experience: 
Prior to the panel study, the Commission had asked 
for a report from the Medical Advisory Board, and a 
preliminary finding came back indicating a "50% loss 
of body function due to musculo-skeletal injuries" with 
a request for further study of "cardiac and pulmonary 
status and its relationship to accident" (T. 27). 
After the panel report was in, the Medical Ad-
visory Board submitted its final report which stated: 
having completed its study and examination 
. . . with respect to the measurement of perma-
nent disp,bility caused by an accident arising out 
of or in the course of his employment . . . (I) 
Specific industrial disabilities chargeable to the 
accident. Oct. 13, 1964. Perm. Total. (T. 70). 
Thus the Medical Advisory Board found permanent 
total disability caused by the accident. This report was 
filed more than a month after plaintiff filed objections 
lo the panel report. Plaintiff is silent throughout this 
<'ase as to this most important report and finding. 
Certain ambiguities in the panel report moved the 
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plaintiffs to seek clarity, and this was provided in a 
hearing before the Commission in which the panel re-
port was elaborated upon and clarified by one of its 
members, Dr. Crockett. 
While it was known by the medical panel that Mr. 
Williams had a pulmonary problem at the time of this 
accident, it was apparently determined to be of minimal 
significance in evaluating his accident derived disability, 
for Dr. Crockett testified that Mr. Williams was "work· 
ing and doing heavy duty work prior to his in-
jury ... so his pulmonary problem apparently was 
not disabling" (T. 79). Further, that he "was suf· 
ficiently able to carry on an occupation of reasonably 
heavy work ... pulmonary wise and cardiac wise" 
(T. 83); that Mr. Williams had "compensated priorto 
the accident" ( T. 84). "His condition was some· 
what stabilized ... it had apparently been reasonably 
stable for several years . . . because he had been em· 
ployed doing reasonably heavy work . . . but he 
apparently had sufficient pulmonary reserve to do a 
job" (T. 85, 86). (Emphasis added.) 
The record is devoid of any showing that Mr. Wil· 
Iiams was disabled or incapacitated prior to the accident 
because of his pulmonary history. He had been treated 
at the Veterans' Hospital before the accident, but con· 
siderable of his previous medical history and records 
had been before the panel, and Dr. Crockett, the testify· 
ing member of the panel, said "I had no evidence for 
disability prior to his injury" ( T. 88). 
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I .. 
This panel report and its studies were adopted by 
the Commission upon its corrobation by Dr. Crockett. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
RAT I N G APPLICANT PERMANENTLY 
AND TOTALLY DISABLED BY REASON OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
As stated in plaintiff's brief at page 6, there is no 
dispute that Mr. Williams is 100% totally and perma-
nently disabled. The question presented for review is 
whether the evidence suports the Commission's finding 
that defendant suffered a 100% disability as a conse-
quence of hi.s accide,nt. 
Plaintiffs contend that some undetermined per-
centage of Mr. Williams' present disability is attribut-
able to a pre-existing condition; that being emphysema 
and chronic bronchitis. It is the defendant's contention, 
to the contrary, that since the evidence supports the 
Commission's finding of 100% disability, which it attrib-
uted to the accident, an inquiry into the referenced pre-
f'Xisting condition would be but an act of futility. 
A review of the record and testimony supports the 
contPntions of the defendants. 
The Commission "initially" ref erred the case to a 
Jle<lical Advisory Board, on Nov. 20, 1965. The exam-
7 
mmg orthopedic doctors Beck, Rees and Holbrook 
reported: 
The board recommends ( 1) 50% loss of bodv 
function .due to musculo-skeletal injuries; (2j 
consultation by Dr. Null for evaluation of car· 
diac and pulmonary status and its relationship to 
accident. ( T. 27) . 
Thereafter the file was forwarded to Dr. Viko for 
study by himself, Dr. Crockett and R. Ershler as a 
panel (T. 30). That panel requested Dr. Null to make 
a further current study of the applicant with special . 
interest on the causal relations to the accident (T. 33). 
Applicant was then examined by Dr. Null, and 
his extensive, careful reports of January 4, 1966, came 
before the panel ( T. 35, 39). Based thereon, the panel 
met with claimant, and thereafter the medical history 
was carefully reviewed and summarized. The panel's ' 
report of January 18, 1966, fully documented and sum· 
marized, was forwarded to the Commission consisting 
of twenty pages (T. 41-60). Based on said documenta· 
tion, the panel found: "that all of these events -
diseases - were causally related to the accident." It 
then made its comments regarding the pulmonary prob· 
lems prior to and after the accident almost as an after· 
thought, using language that applicant's "pulmonar)· 
disease in itself would be sufficient reason for total 
and permanent disability" ( T. 42). The only percentile 
reference is to "a 10-20% additional cause of disability" 
for chronic cardiac disease as evidenced by angina. It 
was this failure to specifically assess percentages that 
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caused plaintiffs to object to the panel report on Febru-
ary 18, 1966 (T. 66) wherein reference is made to the 
initially found 50% loss of bodily function previously 
assigned by the Medical Advisory Board for musculo-
skeletal disability. Plaintiffs asked that the percentage 
for the other disabilities be made more specific ( T. 68) . 
Thereafter, the Medical Advisory Board consisting 
of Doctors Beck, Rees and Holbrook reassessed the 
"Specific industrial disabilities chargeable to the acci-
dent of Oct. 13, 1964," and on March 26, 1966, entered 
its conclusion with the abbreviation: "Perm. Total" 
(T. 70). These latter specialists thus amplified their 
earlier findings of 50 % musculo-skeletal loss of function 
(T. 27) by entering a declaration of permanent total 
disability "chargeable to the accident" ( T. 70). Thus 
two boards - panels of specialists, internists and ortho-
pedists - with vast experience concluded with con-
siderable clarity that the injured man was permanently 
and totally disabled by reason of the industrial accident. 
To further clarify any existing ambiguities, a hear-
ing was held June 16, 1966, at which time plaintiffs' 
counsel obtained whatever clarification may have been 
needed by cross-examining Dr. Crockett. He found 
that the medical panel had meant that Mr. Williams 
suffered a "100% disability as a result of the accident 
and subsequent treatment" (T. 84). In no way did Dr. 
Crockett change the panel report or its meaning; he 
"iaiply clarified and corroborated it. 
lt further appears, due to the manner m which 
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plaintiffs' counsel put the initial question to Dr. Crockett 
regarding musculo-skeletal problems and the subsequent 
discussion, that plaintiffs' counsel erroneously assumed 
that claimant suffered only a 50% musculo-skeletal 
injury, for his inquiry was directed at the 50% disability 
initially assigned by the orthopedic surgeons (T. 78). 
Plaintiffs' brief makes no mention of the subsequent 
finding of permanent total disability as found by the 
Medical Advisory Board. It is important to an under· 
standing of plaintiffs' objections to the panel report and 
the award to realize that its counsel has always errone· 
ously assumed only the 50% musculo-skeletal injury. 
This figure came into the case while Dr. Martin, the at· 
tending orthopedist was still treating claimant and 
there are several ignored reports in the record after said 
"initial" estimate. The final Medical Advisory Board re-
port came in weeks after the panel report had been filed, 
and after the initial objections of plaintiffs had been 
made. Since these eminent orthopedists specifically 
found all that was needed under Utah Code Ann. 
35-1-69 ( 1966) to sustain an award of permanent total 
disability caused by an accident arising out of and in 
the course of employment, a determination of the per· 
centage of pre-existing disability became irreleyant. 
From an orthopedic standpoint alone, unrelated to 
any pre-existing pulmonary condition, this board made 
a sufficient final finding on which the award could be 
predicated. However, the Commission went further 
and requested a panel of internists to make a complete 
study, and the results of this panel would of itself like· 
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wise sustain the award without reference to the ortho-
pedic findings. When these two studies are put together 
that the difficulties of percentiles amount to needless 
further inquiry. Indeed, an inquiry into Mr. Wil-
lims' pre-existing condition would be a specious act, 
so great was the traumatic effect of the injury and the 
subsequent complications incident to treatment. 
In Brown Terry & Woodruff v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 78 Utah 15, 300 Pac. 945 (1931), the claimant 
fell, struck his head on a cement pavement, suffered a 
concussion, then a delayed cerebral hemorrhage, and was 
unconscious for several days thereafter; he also lost one-
half the vision of his remaining eye, suffered pain in his 
head, was nervous, irritable, and lost proper co-ordina-
tion between his mind and limbs. His award of total 
permanent disability was contested in this court on 
grounds that he had lost one eye some years before in 
an accident, and the request was made, as in this case, 
tu relieve the insurance carrier of part payment to be 
made by the special fund by reason of such pre-existing 
loss of one eye. This court refused to so do on a finding 
there was no want of evidence to sustain the total award 
on account of the fall. 
In the case at bar, claimant's total impairment for 
\1ork may be predicated on his musculo-skeletal perma-
11ent injuries, combined with the incidents of treatment 
at the hospital, and their permanent total effect regard-
less of his pulmonary involvements as Dr. Null advised 
the panel and Commission: 
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The trauma associated with the fall and 
ankle fractures did indeed result in enough stress 
to induce the initial cardiac episode and subse- ' 
quent period of hypotensions and renal compro-
mise_ ... it ~ould seem quite likely that the hypo-
tens1ve episode subsequent to the myocardial 
injury was related etiologically to the renal com-
promise. ( T. 54, 55, 60). 
With the clarifying testimony of Dr. Crockett that 
claimant's pulmonary problem was not disabling (T. 
79), that "he has 100% disability as a result of the 
accident and subsequent treatment" (T. 83), and that 1 
the pulmonary problem was "aggravated by his illness 
and by the accident . . . made considerably worse by 
the accident," the pre-existing condition is no more 
relevant or material to the award than the lack of one 
eye in the Brown case, supra. Indeed, in Marker v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 84 Utah 587, 593, 37 P.2d 785, 788, • 
( 1934), this court held that "where the subsequent 
injury to a workman previously disabled, without com· 
bining with a previous injury or condition, results in 
total permanent disability, the employer is liable for the 
whole award." (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, 
it is by combining the minor pulmonary problem before 
the accident with the terrifying results of the accident 
that we get into peculiar percentiles in excess of 100% 
which in the opinion of the defendants is unnecessary. 
unwarranted, confusing, and ridiculous as to result. 
So great was the injury and subsequent involvement. 
panel inquiry into Mr. Williams' pre-existing condition 
as provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1966). 
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need not and, indeed, should not have application. There 
is 100% disability clearly in the record without resort to 
the antecedent, non-disabling conditions; the former 
percentile being found first by the three internists, and 
second, by the three orthopedists, to say nothing of the 
findings of the surgeon, Dr. Martin who likewise re-
ported: 
He was last seen on IOI 4/ 65 and given a 
100 % permanent disability from the type of work 
he was capable of doing, this at the specific 
request of the commission that he make an 'esti-
mate of permanent disability.' (T. 24, 25, reverse 
side). 
An inquiry into the extent of any "previously in-
curred permanent incapacity" was and is unnecessary in 
view of the testimony concerning the nature of the work 
Mr. 'Villiams was performing and the "compensated," 
"stabilized" character of his physical condition at the 
time of the accident. From a work standpoint, the record 
is clear and undisputed, his prior condition was "not 
disabling" ( T. 79). He may have been "rated" for a 
pulmonary condition, but this was relevant only to mili-
tary involvement and the rights incidental thereto, not 
to industrial compensation. 
l. Pre-e.xisting condition had stabilized, compen-
soted: 
There is no dispute in the testimony and record 
but that any pre-existing condition of Mr. Williams had 
hee!l '·compensated" and was "stabilized.'' Certainly, he 
had experienced pulmonary problems in the past, but 
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on a most thorough study of specialists, "this man was 
working and doing heavy-duty work prior to his injury. 1 
So his pulmonary problem apparently was not di8• 
ab ling" ( T. 79) . (Emphasis added.) "Prior to the 
accident this man was working. He was sufficiently able 
to carry on an occupation of reasonably heavy work;' 
( T. 83) . His prior condition "had apparently been rea· 
sonably stable for several years . . . doing reasonably 
heavy work ... apparently had sufficient pulmonary 
reserve to do a job." ( T. 86). "This man was com-
pensated prior to the accident (T. 84). (Emphasis , 
added.) Blakiston's New Gould Medical Dictionary 
defines "compensation" to be: "The act of making 
good a deficiency; the state of counter-balancing a 
function or structural defect." President Eisenhower 
and President Johnson (when he was senator) both 
suffered a cardiac experience, and both are now "well , 
compensated" as is commonly known. 
Plaintiff undertook in cross-examining Dr. Crock· 
ett to relate the pre-existing condition to the defendant's 
present disability, the doctor having said: 
The pulmonary problem is not a result of the 
accident. It was aggravated by his illness and 
by the accident. In other words it was made con· 
siderably worse by the accident. It's an aggra· 
vation situation and not a cause. 
Q. Prior to the accident, 100% pulmonary 
disabled? 
A. No, sir. Since the accident ... since the 
accident he is 100</'o disabled pulmonary wise··· 
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I .... 
He has 100% disability as a result of the accident 
and subsequent treatment. (T. 83, 84). 
As to the pre-existing condition, Dr. Crockett testi-
fied: "So his pulmonary problem apparently was not 
disabling" ( T. 79) . (Emphasis added.) 
2. Rating of Pre-existing Condition Not Nec-
essary: 
Plaintiffs' whole case is predicated on the failure 
of the Commission to assess "the percentage of perma-
nent physical impairment attributable to previously 
existing conditions whether due to accidental injury, 
disease or congenital causes," as set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-69 ( 1966) . 
Plaintiffs' case fails because it ignores that the 
panel report, the final Medical Advisory Board report, 
and the clarifying testimony all of which predicate 
total permanent disability on the accident and sub-
sequent treatment (T. 41, 48). The effect of Dr. 
Crockett's undisputed testimony is that the pre-exist-
ing condition is immaterial, so severe were the injury 
and subsequent events occuring at the hospital. Pressed 
by counsel to make an immaterial assessment under 
the three criteria of Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-69 (1966), 
Dr. Crockett computed total percentages of disability 
up to 170%, which created an absurd result. Under 
no interpretation can the findings and conclusions of 
the medical panel, adopted by the Co~ission, result 
iu the defendant having less than 100% residual im-
pairment resulting from the accident in the course 
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of his employment. The Commission adopted and 
found the 100% impairment directly as a result of 
the fall and subsequent aggravation; and being thor-
oughly documented and undisputed from a medical 
standpoint, the ultimate determination by the Commis· 
sion should not be disturbed by this court. To attempt 
to reduce the 100% by plaintiff's argument is to compel 
resort to the immaterial semantics of discussing per· 
centages in excess of 100 % . In terms of the facts estab· 
lished above, the application of the law of this court 
totally vindicates the award. 
The panel, the board, Dr. Crockett and also the 
Commission's ultimate findings are further corrobo-
rated by the finding and recommendation of Dr. A. F. 
Martin, the orthopedist who did the surgery: 
It is my feeling that he is 100% permanently 
disabled for employment as to the type of work 
he was, and is, capable of doing. 
His additional problems of pulmonary insuf · 
ficiency with recurrent asthmatic attacks and 
necessity of barbituate sedation is not directly 
related to his industrial problems. (T. 21, 24. 
25). 
If, as a last resort, it is found necessary to apply Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-69 ( 1966) , the provisions therein 
first require the medical panel to determine the perma· 
nent disability of the claimant. Upon finding the per· 
centage of permanent disability they are next to de· 
termine what percentage of this permanent disability 
is attributable to the accident or an aggravation thereof. 
Finally, they are to ascertain what percentage of saiil 
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permanent disability is attributable to a pre-existing 
incapacity. In the instant case, a determination was 
made that the claimant was 1003 disabled. 503 of this 
disability was initially found to be the direct result of 
injury to his musculo-skeletal system sustained at the 
time of the injury ( T. 27, 28). This preliminary finding 
was later altered to amount in effect to 1003; but for 
present purposes of argument, assume 503 musculo-
skeletal injury. An additional 10% to 20% disability 
was attributed to a cardiac condition resulting from said 
injury (T. 81, 42). In addition, the medical panel found 
the claimant to be 1003 disabled by reason of a pulmo-
nary condition (T. 42, 81, 82, 83). It is with regard to 
the pulmonary disability that the present controversy 
reposes. The medical panel for reasons of its own did 
not see fit to ascertain the specific degree of pulmonary 
disability that may have existed prior to the accident, 
but Dr. Crockett testified such condition was compen-
sated, not disabling ( T. 79, 84). 
In view of the above statement of facts, the 
following two lines of argument may be pursued. 
a. Since the evidence sustains the finding that 1003 
of the claimant's disability either resulted directly from 
the accident or is attributable to an aggravation there-
of, the panel would have been indulging in an act of 
futility to have looked beyond the injury and its con-
sequeuces in order to assess some hypothetical percent-
age for pre-existing incapacity. 
h. 'Vhile the final report of the Medical Advisory 
17 
Board holds total and permanent disability, for purposes 
of argument, given only the preliminary 50% disabilit\' .1 
attributed to musculo-skeletal difficulties, and a mini-
1 
mum of 10% attributable to the cardiac condition result-
ing from the accident, or an aggravation resulting there-
from, or aggravated thereby, the evidence need only 
substantiate a 40% pulmonary disability attributable : 
to the accident directly or by reason of aggravation iu 
order to reach the requisite 100%. In view of the appli-
cant's ability to perform heavy work on a full-time basis 
prior to the accident, the fact that he was "compensated,'' 
that his condition had been "stable for several years," 
and that he "had sufficient pulmonary reserve to do a 
job," it must be concluded in the light of the applicant's 
present pulmonary condition that more than 40% of his 
pulmonary disability is attributable to the accident and 
subsequent hospitalization. Otherwise, he would hare , 
been suffering at least a 60% disability prior to the 
accident, which his work record belies. 
If then, 40% of his pulmonary condition is related 
directly to the accident or an aggravation resulting from 
the vast complications of the infarction, low-blood pres-
sure, renal shut-down, pneumonia, to say nothing of the 
lumbar fracture, then the award of the Commission must 
be sustained. 
3. Deci.'lions Re the Special Fund: 
Keeping in mind that Dr. Crockett's uncontra-
dicted testimony stated applicant's prior "pulmonary 
problem apparently was not disabling,'' Justice Follan(L 
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writing for the court stated in Marker v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 84 Utah 587, 593, 37 P.2d 785, 788 (1931): 
This court has held that where the subsequent 
injury to a workman previously disabled, without 
combining with a previous injury or condition, 
results in total permanent disability, the employer 
is liable for the whole award. Standard Coal v. 
Industrial Comm., 69 U 83, 252 P 292; Brown et 
al v. Industrial Comm., 78U15, 300 P 945. 
In the Standard Coal case cited above in Marker 
this court held, 69 Utah at 90, 252, P2d at 294: 
It must be admitted that at the time the appli-
cant entered the employ of the Standard Coal 
Company he was suffering bodily infirmities, such 
infirmities as would render him more liable to 
suffer injuries from an accident than if the prior 
injuries had not occurred. There is, however, no 
evidence that these infirmities ever incapacitated 
him for work or that there had been any decrease 
in wages by reason of his physical condition .... 
That the employe had infirmities or diseases that 
might and did render him more susceptible to 
injury resulting from an accident does not relieve 
the employer from the duty to pay such compen-
sation. [Emphasis added.) 
l i must be noted that substantially the same applicable 
statutory enactment was operative in 1926, at the time 
of' the Standard decision, as is now in effect, with the 
llotahlc exception of the following instruction which re-
<;t1ircs the assessment of precentages for previously in-
e11rrrd permanent incapacity in Utah Code Ann. § 35-
HHJ ( 1966): 
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but the liability of his employer shall be for 
the latter injury only and the remainder shall be 
paid out of the special fund. 
Furthermore, as elaborated in the Standard Coal case 
' 
supra, 69 Utah at 11, 252 P.2d at 292: 
It is no defense to a claim for compensation 
that the injury lighted up, reopened, or revived 
an existing infirmity of the injured employee 
.... The principle or rule of law there announced 
is supported by the great weight of authority, 
if not by the unanimous opinion of the courts. 
Our statutes prescribe no standard of health or 
of physical condition to entitle one to the bene· 
fits of the Compensation Act. 
The remarkable pertinence of the Standard case to the 
one at bar is the highlighting of the various pre-exist· 
ing difficulties present in the Standard case which were 
elaborated in the dissent, 69 Utah at 94, 252 P.2d at 
297 (dissenting opinion) . 
. . . a prior severe fracture and breaking of the 
bones of the skull ... the amputation of two 
fingers and a part of the hand ... the shattering . 
of the hip bone ... [rendering] the leg consid· ' 
erably shorter than the other; ... the breaking · 
of his ribs ... [and] hole torn in his side. 
Yet, in the Standard case, this court affirmed the Com· 
mission's finding that the aforementioned trauma did 
not causally detract from the last injury for which the 
applicant was given a total, permanent award. 
The Panel and the Commission found in this case 
that applicant's condition after the accident was reJnted 
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to the fall and subsequent complications, which puts 
the matter clearly within the doctrine of the Standard 
Cual case, and makes it unnecessary and immaterial to 
iuquire further into the Veterans Hospital history.1 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN 
FAILING TO DETERMINE THE PERCENT-
AGE OF IMPAIRMENT DUE TO PRE-EX-
IST ING CONDITION. 
As argued in Point I, the finding of the Panel and 
the Commission is ~hat 100% of applicant's present 
condition was and is due to the injury and subsequent 
treatment complications. There was not a misapplica-
tion of law in that finding as argued by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff objected to the panel report and asked 
for a hearing which was had, resulting in the strong 
corroboration by Dr. Crockett of the panel report. As 
stated by plaintiff, this court will not disturb disputed 
findings of fact, but will only review errors of law. 
It is submitted the findings of fact are not in dispute. 
The only error at law argued is the failure of the Com-
mission to make a useless referral of the case back to 
tbe panel for further inquiry into the Veterans Hospital 
records in aid of attributing some percentage of dis-
ability to a pre-existing incapacity. The hearing was 
l S0e also Brown Terry & \V(lodruff v. Industrial Comm'n, 300 
Pac 945 (Utah 1931); In re Larson, 279 Pac. 1087 (Idaho 1929); 
Hackford v. Industrial Comm'n, 380 P.2d 927 (Utah 1963). 
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held for the purpose and had the effect of clarif yinu 
any ambiguity in the panel report in this regard. Plain~ 
tiff asked "That the file be sent back to the panel, and 
ask them to clarify that particular point." 
Defendants submit that resort to "all medical 
aspects," which counsel argues to mean further stud1 
of Veterans' Administration files, is not required in tl;e 
absence of clear evidence of a prior permanent injury 
or disease which due to an accident results in perrna· 
nent incapacity substantially greater than the appli-
cant would have incurred if he had not had the pre· 
existing incapacity. 
Plaintiff wants further information as to the pre· 
existing condition, but Dr. Crockett was satisfied with 
the evidence in the record, leading him to say "I hail 
no evidence for disability prior to his injury ... I kne11 
that he had pulmonary emphysema and chronic brou· 
chitis, due to his history. Due to the Veterans' Hos· 
pital records" ( T. 88) . True those records were not 
pursued, but in view of the satisfactory evidence befon 
the panel that he had "compensated" and was do· 
ing "heavy work" it is submitted that no further in· 
quiry was necessary. There was sufficient factual in· 
formation available to indicate that the pre-existing 
condition was of such minor moment, in terms of the 
serious injury and its results, as to make a specific 
prior rating superfluous. The expert boards founil 
100% permanent disability resulting directly from th{ 
accident. As stated earlier, it would not aid this CoJIJ 
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mission nor this court to conjure with disability per-
~eutages in excess of 100%. 
POINT III 
ANY ERROR IN THE COMMISSION'S 
HOLDING THAT UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-
69 (1966) DOES NOT APPLY IS HARMLESS. 
The fore-part of the order of the Commission is 
not correct in finding: 
The Motion to Dismiss and Objections are 
apparently based on Section 35-1-69 UCA which 
was substantially amended by the 1965 Legis-
lature, effective July 1, 1965. The Section as 
amended applies to injuries occurring after the 
effective date of the am®ded Section. To hold 
otherwise would be retroactive legislation and 
therefore unconstitutional. (T. 92). 
It could be that the Commission assumed that the 
1963 amendments did not become law until 1965 in 
which case its application would be retroactive if ap-
plied to this case,. But such error was harmless, and 
the results are not changed as to this 1964 accident 
because the panel report and Dr. Crockett's testimony 
predicate 100% disability on the accident. 
The conclusions of the Commission are correct 
although some of the reasoning set forth in the order 
JrP in error. However, it is the result reached, in terms 
1Jf' tlie evidence, and not the reasons given that are to 
br sustained here. 
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POINT IV 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IK 1 
ADOPTING THE MEDICAL PANEL RE- I 
PORT. 
Point III of plaintiff's brief is somewhat mislead· 
ing. While it is probably true that the Panel report 1 
"was ambiguous and the same needed clarification hr, 
the doctor's further testimony," the plaintiff's clau~ 
is entirely erroneous that "the testimony of Dr. Crock· 
ett did not sustain the medical panel report." 
The panel report states, after reviewing the in· , 
itial injury, that there was evidence of severe low blood 
pressure, myocardial infarction, kidney poisoning, ane· 
mia and then a pneumonia, and then adds: "The Panel 
feels that all of these events-diseases-were causally 
related to the accident" (T. 41, 42). The ambiguity ' 
occurs thereafter in comments on the pulmonary dis· 1 
ease and complications. It is submitted that Dr. Crock· 
ett clearly relieved the panel report of ambiguity an<l, 
in no way did he disagree with nor negative the panel; 
report, rather he sustained the findings of the panel in ' 
every particular. Confirmative of the panel, Dr. Crock· 
ett testified that the applicant had "100% disability as 
a result of the accident and subsequent treatment." Snh· 
sequent to Dr. Crockett's testimony, counsel for the 
applicant-defendant undertook to make sure that the 
entire medical record was a part of the transcript l11 
which plaintiff did not object ( T. 88, 89). In view of 
Dr. Crockett's corroboration of the medical panel re· 
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port, the problems raised in Hackford v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899 (1961), are 
not pertinent. The medical reports, which are most com-
plete, were properly adopted and they form a complete 
reciprocal support for the testimony of Dr. Crockett. 
Likewise they sustain the ultimate award of the Com-
ffi1Ss10n. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission did not err in its award of 100% 
permanent, total disability, due to injury received in 
an industrial accident while at work, for the plaintiff, 
E. Halvorsen, Inc. The award is fully sustained by the 
medical information, panel reports, and the testimony. 
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W. C. LAMOREAUX 
415 South 2nd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant 
Theodore W. Williams 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
JOHN G. AVERY 
Assistant Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Attorney for Defendant 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
25 
